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Abstract Results from behavioral studies of amnesic patients and neuroimaging studies of individuals 
with intact memory suggest that a brain system involving direct contributions from the medial temporal 
lobes supports both remembering the past and imagining the future (Episodic Future Thinking). In the 
present study, we investigated whether amnesic Mild Cognitive Impairment (aMCI) affects EFT. Amnesic 
MCI is a high-risk factor for Alzheimer's disease and is characterized by a selective impairment of 
episodic memory, likely reflecting hippocampal malfunctioning. The present study assessed, for the first 
time, whether the reduction of episodic specificity for past events, evident in aMCI patients, extends also 
to future events. We present data on 14 aMCI patients and 14 healthy controls, who mentally re-
experienced and pre-experienced autobiographical episodes. Transcriptions were segmented into distinct 
details that were classified as either internal (episodic) or external (semantic). Results revealed that aMCI 
patients produced fewer episodic, event-specific details, and an increased number of semantic details for 
both past and future events, as compared to controls. These results are discussed with respect to the 
constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, which suggests that reminiscence and future thinking are the 
expression of the same neurocognitive system. 
 
Keywords Future, Memory, Amnesia 
 
1. Introduction 
The ability to mentally travel forth in time has been differently referred to as prospection (Buckner & 
Carroll, 2007), proscopic chronesthesia (Tulving, 2002), or episodic future thinking (Atance & O’Neill, 
2001).            
 In recent years, an increasing number of cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging studies 
have suggested that remembering the past and imagining the future rely on common psychological and 
neural processes. For instance, it has been shown that the phenomenal characteristics associated with 
both projecting oneself into the past or into the future are influenced by similar factors, such as the 
temporal distance from the present (D’Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004; see also Addis et al., 2008, 
D’Argembeau and van der Linden, 2006 and Spreng and Levine, 2006). Recent neuroimaging studies have 
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demonstrated that remembering past events and imagining novel scenarios that might happen in the 
future rely on a common network of neural regions (e.g., Addis et al., 2009a, Addis et al., 2007, Okuda et 
al., 2003 and Szpunar et al., 2007). This common network of prefrontal, medial temporal lobe, and 
posterior regions, including the posterior cingulated and retrosplenial cortex, is remarkably similar to the 
network involved in the retrieval of episodic memories of past autobiographical events (e.g., Cabeza and 
St Jacques, 2007 and Maguire, 2001). Most recently, this network of regions has been suggested to belong 
to an anatomically defined brain system (default network) that is activated when individuals engage in 
internally focused tasks including autobiographical memory retrieval, envisioning the future, and 
conceiving the perspectives of others (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008). There is also 
evidence that amnesic patients highly impaired on retrieving past events may be also impaired in 
imagining future autobiographical events ( Hassabis et al., 2007, Klein and Loftus, 2002 and Tulving, 
1985).            
 In light of such findings, it has been proposed that the constructive nature of episodic memory 
allows one to draw on the past and to flexibly extract and re-combine elements of previous experiences 
(Buckner and Carroll, 2007, Hassabis and Maguire, 2007 and Schacter and Addis, 2007). This 
conceptualization is often referred to as the constructiveepisodicsimulationhypothesis (Schacter & Addis, 
2007).            
 One key outstanding issue that still needs to be clarified concerns the precise relationship 
between future-event simulation and episodic memory in patients suffering from episodic memory 
impairments. As mentioned above, in the neuropsychological literature, two amnesic patients suffering 
from total loss of episodic memory, K.C. (Tulving, 1985) and D.B. (Klein & Loftus, 2002), were 
described as being highly impaired on both retrieving past and imagining future autobiographical events. 
K.C. suffered from an extensive brain damage, affecting medial temporal, prefrontal and other brain 
regions, while little information was provided concerning the location of D.B.’s lesion. Most recently, 
Hassabis et al. (2007) have found that imagined experiences of five patients with amnesia deriving from 
bilateral hippocampal damage were deficient in spatial coherence, relative to controls, resulting in their 
constructions being fragmented and lacking in richness. In this study, however, participants were not 
specifically requested to construct scenes pertaining to future events, therefore leaving open the 
possibility that patients with hippocampal damage suffer from a more general event simulation deficit in 
constructing novel scenes, irrespective of time period (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008). Therefore, 
these studies do not allow one to draw precise conclusions concerning the basis for the patients’ future 
events simulation deficit and its relation to their episodic memory problems. The idea that thinking of the 
future is closely related to retrospective memory received strong support by recent evidence indicating 
that healthy older adults (Addis et al., 2008) and patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD; Addis, Sacchetti, 
Allyc, Budson, & Schacter, 2009) show impairments, although different in severity, in autobiographical 
memory as well as in future-event simulation.       
 As far as healthy aging is concerned, studies on autobiographical memory have demonstrated 
that, compared to young people, older adults tend to recollect fewer details about happenings, locations, 
perceptions, and thoughts, whereas they produce an equivalent, or larger, number of semantic details that 
are not connected to any particular time or place (e.g., Levine et al., 2002 and Piolino et al., 2002). These 
specific age-related differences in the qualities of autobiographical recollections have been accounted for 
within recent models of autobiographical memory (e.g., Conway, 2001 and Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 
2000). Such models distinguish between the episodic component of autobiographical memory, providing 
lower level event-specific sensory and perceptual episodic information, which is affected by healthy aging, 
from the semantic component of autobiographical memory, containing a more abstract autobiographical 
knowledge base and the conceptual self, which is preserved in healthy aging. Recently, Addis et al. (2008) 
demonstrated that the age-related reduction of episodic specificity, evident for past events, extends also to 
future events. In particular, when probed to generate autobiographical events from the past and the 
future, older adults produced fewer internal-episodic details and more external-non-episodic details, as 
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assessed by the scoring procedure of Levine et al.’s (2002) Autobiographical Interview. Furthermore, the 
number of internal event-specific details and external semantic details were correlated across past and 
future events, and the number of internal details for both past and future events correlated significantly 
with a measure of relational memory (paired-associate learning) that is known to be dependent on the 
hippocampus (Giovanello, Schnyer, & Verfaellie, 2004). This pattern of results suggests that both 
retrieving past and imagining future detailed autobiographical events rely on relational memory, i.e., the 
ability to re-combine and integrate details from various episodic memories. The pattern of decreased 
internal and increased external details for past and future events likely reflects an increased reliance on 
external semantic details when people are unable to generate internal-episodic details (Addis et al., 2008).
 With respect to AD, in addition to episodic memory problems, which are the hallmark and the 
earliest manifestation of this neurodegenerative disease, there are also major semantic memory 
dysfunctions (e.g., Chertkow and Bub, 1990 and Hodges and Patterson, 1995). This conjoined pattern of 
deficits, which is clearly detectable by traditional laboratory and neuropsychological tests, also affects the 
content of autobiographical memory. In general, there have been several studies, using a variety of 
methods, showing a deficit in the retrieval of autobiographical memories with a shallow temporal gradient 
indicating more successful retrieval of earlier memories (e.g., Hou et al., 2005, Ivanoiu et al., 2006, 
Kopelman et al., 1989, Nestor et al., 2002, Piolino et al., 2002 and Snowden et al., 1996). As far as the 
integrity of the episodic and semantic components of autobiographical memory is concerned, most 
studies documented some level of impairment in one or both types of memory. However, results of 
recent studies that used different memory tests, such as the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire of 
Kopelman, Wilson, and Baddeley (1990) and the Autobiographical Interview of Levine et al. (2002), 
converged in showing severe deficits in AD patients in both the episodic and semantic component of 
autobiographical memory (e.g., Ivanoiu et al., 2006 and Leyhe et al., 2009).    
 In a very recent study, Addis, Sacchetti, et al. (2009) tested the ability of AD patients and age-
matched controls to generate past and future autobiographical events. Results showed that AD patients 
exhibited deficits in both remembering past events and simulating future events, generating fewer internal 
and external episodic details (as estimated by the scoring procedure of the Autobiographical Interview) 
than healthy older controls. In line with the results of Addis et al. (2008), the internal and external detail 
scores were strongly correlated across past and future events. The authors attributed the semantic 
autobiographical deficit evident in AD (for both past and future events) to the progression of the atrophy 
of the hippocampus, beyond the medial temporal regions to larger portions of the neocortex supporting 
semantic memory (Leyhe et al., 2009). The results of Addis, Sacchetti, et al.’s (2009) study therefore 
suggest a close association between future thinking and retrospective memory. However, mild AD 
patients participating in this study may have been impaired on cognitive functions other than episodic 
memory that may have contributed – to some extent – to their future-event simulation deficits. 
Neuropsychological testing indeed revealed some impairment in executive functioning (as assessed by the 
Trial Making Test-Part B). The supposed symmetry of past and future episodic deficits should be further 
investigated in populations affected by selective memory impairment.    
 The aim of the current study is to assess the relation between past and future thinking in patients 
suffering from amnesic Mild Cognitive Impairment (aMCI). The term MCI has become widely used to 
describe a condition in old people whose memory and/or other cognitive abilities are below the normal 
level, but who do not meet the accepted criteria for dementia. Clinically, different subtypes of MCI have 
been recognized, with the amnesic subtype having an elevated risk of progressing to Alzheimer's Disease 
(AD; rate of conversion to AD is 10–15% per year; Gauthier et al., 2006, Petersen and Negash, 2008 and 
Petersen et al., 2001). Amnesic MCI is characterized by a selective and isolated impairment of episodic 
memory, while the other cognitive functions and the ability to deal with daily living activities are relatively 
preserved. Patients with aMCI typically show atrophy of the hippocampus and other medial temporal 
lobe regions (e.g., Jack et al., 2000 and Killiany et al., 2002). The isolated impairment of episodic memory, 
due to hippocampal malfunctioning, renders aMCI a clinical condition particularly suitable for a direct 
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assessment of the relation between past and future thinking. If, as suggested by the constructive episodic 
simulation hypothesis, people use episodic memory to imagine future autobiographical events, and as 
aMCI is considered to be a transitional stage between healthy aging and AD, and given that both these 
extremes of the aging process show some form of impairment in autobiographical memory as well as 
episodic future thinking, aMCI patients should show an impairment in autobiographical memory and 
episodic future thinking somehow intermediate to that of normal aging and AD. In this respect, it is 
important to note that there is some evidence showing that autobiographical memory is indeed impaired 
in aMCI. For example, using the Autobiographical Interview (Levine et al., 2002), Murphy, Troyer, 
Levine, and Moscovitch (2008), found that, although aMCI and healthy controls generated protocols of 
similar length, the aMCI group produced fewer episodic, event-specific details and an increased number 
of semantic details in their recollections, as compared to controls. This pattern of reduced episodic but 
elevated semantic autobiographical memory in aMCI as compared to healthy controls magnifies finding 
with healthy older adults relative to younger adults for past events.     
 The present study, which for the first time assesses episodic future thinking in aMCI, will help 
track the course of the deficit in past and future thinking, thus providing potentially important 
information on the relation between these two supposedly associated cognitive processes. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants 
Fourteen old adults affected by aMCI and 14 healthy controls participated in this experiment. 
 The participants with aMCI were selected from a larger panel at the Laboratory of 
Neuropsychology of Aging of the Department of Geriatrics (ASL Napoli 1). The diagnosis of aMCI was 
reached according to the criteria proposed by Petersen et al. (1999), including (a) exclusion criteria for 
dementia (DSM-IV, APA, 1994); (b) memory complaints documented by the patient or by a collateral 
source; (c) a performance of at least 1.5 standard deviations below age and education matched controls on 
at least one of the measures assessing episodic memory included in the Mental Deterioration Battery 
(MDB – Carlesimo, Caltagirone, & Gainotti, 1996); (d) no evidence of significant deficits in other 
cognitive domains explored by means of the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, 
& McHugh, 1975; Italian norms in Measso et al., 1993), the MDB (Carlesimo et al., 1996), and the Frontal 
Assessment Battery (FAB – Dubois, Slachevsky, Litvan, & Pillon, 2000; Italian norms in Iavarone et al., 
2004); (e) a score of at least 26 on the MMSE; (d) no evidence of difficulties in everyday activities; (f) no 
history of stroke or other cerebrovascular disease; (g) no evidence of metabolic, endocrine, or nutritional 
deficiencies.          
 Healthy older adults were members of different, non-academic, local associations. Individuals 
assuming psychoactive pharmacological treatment able to alter normal memory skills, with a history of 
neurological and psychiatric disorders and the elderly with a score less than 26 on the MMSE were 
excluded from the study. There were no significant differences (all ps > .05) between aMCI and controls 
on demographic variables related to age (aMCI, M = 74.7, SD = 7.4; controls, M = 73.5, SD = 8.0), 
education (aMCI, M = 12.8, SD = 5.1; controls, M = 13.0, SD = 2.0), and on the MMSE scores (aMCI, 
M = 24.8, SD = 2.8; controls, M = 26.3, SD = 1.3). Elderly with aMCI and controls gave informed 
written consent prior to the commencement of the study and did not receive financial compensation for 
participation. The study procedure was approved by the local ethical committee and was performed in 
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
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2.2. Materials and procedure 
The experiment was conducted in one single session. Participants mentally re-experienced and pre-
experienced four autobiographical episodes (occurred or occurring within the past or next year) in 
response to eight cue words. More precisely, two sets of eight words, matched for familiarity, frequency, 
imageability, and concreteness, were selected from Italian norms (Burani, Barca, & Arduino, 2001). 
Within each set, the words were randomly cycled through temporal direction (remember or imagine). 
Each participant was then assigned to one of these two lists of words. Half participants performed the 
past task first, followed by the future task, the other half received the opposite sequence. The 
experimental procedure was adapted from D’Argembeau and van der Linden (2004) and from Addis et al. 
(2008). Participants were encouraged to retrieve and imagine temporally and contextually specific events. 
Future events also had to be plausible, given the participant's plans, and novel, that is, not previously 
experienced by the participant. Each cue word was displayed on the computer screen together with task 
instructions concerning the temporal direction (remember or imagine) and the time period (last year or 
next year). Once an event had been retrieved or imagined (there was no time limit for retrieving or 
imagining an event), participants were given 60 s to retrieve or imagine as many details as possible. 
Participants then described their past and future representations (their responses were recorded using a 
digital audio-recorder for later transcription) and rated each event, using a 7-point scale (Szpunar & 
McDermott, 2008), on (a) three measures that were summed to form a sensorial details index (visual 
details, sounds, smell/taste; 1 = none, 7 = a lot), (b) three measures that were summed to form a clarity 
of context index (clarity of location, clarity of spatial arrangement of objects, clarity of spatial arrangement 
of people; 1 = vague, 7 = clear), and (c) a measure of the subjective experience associated with the mental 
image (feeling of experiencing the event, 1 = none, 7 = a lot). Furthermore, participants also indicated the 
novelty of each imagined event by rating how often they had experienced in the past the same or a very 
similar event (1 = never; 7 = very often). This question was aimed at ensuring that participants were 
imagining truly novel scenarios rather than retrieving an event that had already taken place and adjusting 
it to fit in with the test requirements (see Gamboz, Brandimonte, & De Vito, 2010).   
 The qualities of the autobiographical recollections and simulations were estimated using the 
standardized scoring procedure developed by Levine et al. (2002). More precisely, for each past and 
future-event produced by participants, the central event (the event discussed in most detail that occurred 
over a brief time-frame) was first identified. The central event was then segmented into details, i.e., unique 
occurrences, observations, or thoughts (that typically occur as grammatical clauses defined by a subject 
and predicate, such as “I dropped my sandwich”). Details were classified as internal or external, internal 
details being those that were specific to time and place, and considered to reflect episodic re- or pre-
experiencing, and external details being those that pertained to extraneous information that was not 
uniquely specific to the main event being described and not anchored to the time and place. Internal 
details were divided into further subcategories: (a) event (happenings, people involved, actions, nature of 
the environment), (b) place (information about where the event occurred), (c) time (date, season, or time 
of day), (d) perceptual (sensory information) and (e) emotion/thought relating to the event. External 
details were also subcategorized: (a) event (specific details from other incidents, from all of the above 
categories, external to the main event recalled or imagined), (b) semantic (general knowledge or facts, 
ongoing events, extended states of being), (c) repetition (unsolicited repetition of details), and (d) other 
(metacognitive statements, editorializing). The transcriptions were segmented into internal and external 
details by a single trained rater, who was blind to the hypotheses of the study. It is relevant to note that 
this rater scored events in a manner that was highly reliable with the ratings provided by the experimenter. 
The inter-rater reliability (r) was .82 and .88 for internal and external details, respectively. 
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3. Results 
3.1. Design of the analyses 
Results concerning group differences in the phenomenal characteristics of past and future events will be 
reported first. Then, group differences in the qualities of the autobiographical recollections and 
simulations (i.e., in the number of internal and external details) will be examined. Finally, following Addis 
et al. (2008), the correlations between internal and external details of past and future events will be 
reported. 
3.2. Ratings of phenomenal characteristics 
Separate 2 (Group: aMCI vs. controls) × 2 (Temporal Direction: past vs. future) mixed analyses of 
variance (ANOVA) were carried out for each phenomenal characteristic. The mean ratings are presented 
in Table 1.            Results indicated that there were no group differences, F(1, 26) = 1.47, or differences between 
memories for past events and representations of future events, F(1, 26) = 0.14, in terms of sensorial 
details. Analogously, the interaction between Group and Temporal Direction was not significant, F(1, 26) 
= 0.37. As regards clarity of location, there were no group differences, F(1, 26) = 0.24. However, results 
indicated that memories for past events were more clearly represented than representations of future 
events, F(1, 26) = 5.13, View the MathML source, p < .05. A significant Group × Temporal Direction 
interaction, F(1, 26) = 4.59, View the MathML source, p < .05, revealed that the difference between past 
and future events was evident only in the aMCI group. Concerning the subjective experience associated 
with the mental image, the control group showed stronger feelings of experiencing the events, F(1, 26) = 
12.91, View the MathML source, p < .001, than aMCI patients. The main effect of Temporal Direction, 
F(1, 26) = 2.05, and the interaction between Group × Temporal Direction, F(1, 26) = 0.72, were not 
significant.          
 With respect to the novelty of future representations, Gamboz et al. (2010) hypothesized that, to 
the extent that participants envisage truly novel scenarios, the novelty of their representations should be 
rated as high, that is, envisaged future events should be rated as never having happened before. However, 
an inspection of the frequency distribution of ratings (Table 2) suggests that this was the case only for the 
control group in this study. In fact, less than 30% of future events produced by aMCI patients were rated 
as novel. In contrast, the control group rated 66% of future events as novel. Group differences in the 
mean rating of frequency of occurrence were indeed significant, t(26) = −5.48, View the MathML source, 
p < .0001. The implications of this result for the interpretation of group differences in episodic future 
thinking will be addressed in Section 4. 
3.3. Number of internal and external details 
A 2 (Group: aMCI vs. controls) × 2 (Details: internal vs. external) × 2 (Temporal Direction: past vs. 
future) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with Group as a between-subjects factor, and Details and 
Temporal Direction as within-subjects factors, was conducted on the mean number of details produced 
by aMCI and controls (see Fig. 1). Results showed that, overall, aMCI patients (M = 5.33; SD = 3.06) and 
controls (M = 5.36; SD = 3.31) produced an equivalent number of details, F(1, 26) = 0.005, indicating 
that both groups produced protocols of similar length. Given that group differences in general 
conversational style may affect the interpretation of the results, we further analyzed whether there were 
group differences in the mean number of words used to describe past and future events. Results of a 2 
(Group: aMCI vs. controls) × 2 (Temporal Direction: past vs. future) mixed ANOVA showed that there 
were no differences between groups Fs(1, 26) < 0.76. The mean numbers of words used by controls to 
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describe past and future events were 105.23 (SD = 40.65) and 103.89 (SD = 34.55) respectively; the mean 
numbers of words used by aMCI patients to describe past and future events were 90.55 (SD = 36.64) and 
96.03 (SD = 51.36) respectively.1  
The main effect of Details, F(1, 26) = 5.11, , p < .05, was significant, indicating that, overall, 
participants produced more internal (M = 5.89; SD = 3.15) than external details (M = 4.75; SD = 3.12). 
The interaction between Group and Details, F(1, 26) = 35.72, , p < .0001, and between Group 
and Direction, F(1, 26) = 7.10, , p < .01 were significant. These interactions showed, 
respectively, that controls produced more internal details (M = 7.42; SD = 1.98) than aMCI patients 
(M = 4.42; SD = 1.87), t(27) = 4.11, , p < .0001, whereas aMCI patients produced more 
external details (M = 6.31; SD = 2.26) than controls (M = 3.23; SD = 1.36), t(27) = −4.37, , 
p < .0001, and that controls produced more details for past (M = 6.14; SD = 1.80) than for future events 
(M = 4.53; SD = 1.38), t(13) = 3.38, , p < .005, whereas  aMCI patients produced an 
equivalent number of details for past (M = 5.50; SD = 1.85) and for future events (M = 5.58; SD = 1.60), 
t(13) = −0.67. The interaction between Details and Temporal Direction was also significant, F(1, 
26) = 72.71, , p < .0001, indicating that more internal details were produced for past (M = 7.48; 
SD = 3.0) than for future events (M = 4.35; SD = 2.5), t(27) = 6.50, , p < .0001, whereas more 
external details were produced for future (M = 5.71; SD = 3.7) than for past events (M = 3.88; SD = 2.0), 
t(27) = −2.77, , p < .01. Finally, the Group × Details × Temporal Direction interaction was 
also significant, F(1, 26) = 28.13, , p < .0001. In order to better describe this three-way 
interaction, we conducted two separate follow-up Group × Temporal Direction ANOVAs for internal 
and external details. The results of the ANOVA on internal details showed main effects of both Group 
and of Temporal Direction, Fs(1, 26) > 16.83, , ps < .0001, indicating that aMCI patients 
produced less internal details as compared to controls and that, overall, more internal details were 
produced for past than for future events. The difference between the number of internal details for past 
and future events was equivalent in the two groups of participants, as indicated by a non-significant 
Group × Temporal Direction Interaction (see Fig. 1). The results of the ANOVA on external details 
showed a main effect of Group and of Temporal Direction, Fs(1, 26) > 15.57, , ps < .0001, 
indicating that aMCI patients produced more external details as compared to controls, and that, overall, 
more external details were produced for future than for past events. However, a significant 
Group × Temporal Direction interaction, F(1, 26) = 28.82, , p < .0001, revealed that the 
difference between the number of external details for past and future events was significant only for the 
aMCI patients, t(13) = −5.46, , p < .0001 (see Fig. 1). 
3.4. Correlations 
We computed correlations between internal and external details for past and future events across all 
participants. In line with results reported by Addis et al. (2008), we found a significant correlation 
between past and future internal details (r = .58, p < .001) and a marginally significant correlation 
between past and future external details (r = .35, p = .06). These positive correlations have been 
accounted for as evidence of the striking overlap between the specificity of past and future events (Addis 
et al., 2008).          
 However, we also found a significant negative correlation between future internal and external 
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details (r = −.55, p < .01). It is important to note that recently Addis, Sacchetti, et al. (2009) found a 
negative correlation between future internal and external details, computed using data from healthy old 
adults and AD patients, that approached significance when few covariates (MMSE, phonemic and 
semantic fluency) were controlled for. The authors suggested that their finding might indicate that, when 
controlling for cognitive decline and fluency abilities, those subjects who generate more external details 
also generate fewer internal details. In the present study, there were no significant differences between 
aMCI and controls on the MMSE scores. In addition, performance of all aMCI patients in the phonemic 
fluency task (Carlesimo et al., 1995) was within the normal range for age and education (range = 17–45; 
M = 28.1; SD = 6.8; data on controls were not available). It seems therefore plausible to conclude that, in 
general, the pattern of decreased internal and increased external details for past and future events, 
commonly observed across the aging process, likely reflects an increased reliance on external semantic 
details when unable to generate internal-episodic details, as originally suggested by Addis et al. (2008). 
4. Discussion 
This study is the first to assess episodic future thinking in aMCI patients. Results revealed that aMCI 
patients produced fewer episodic, event-specific details, and an increased number of semantic details in 
their recollections and simulation of past and future as compared to controls. Furthermore, both groups 
produced more internal details for past than for future events, whereas the number of external details was 
higher for future than past events only for aMCI patients. Differences between controls and aMCI 
patients in general conversational style were not a factor of concern in the interpretation of these results. 
In fact, when describing past and future events, aMCI patients and controls produced, overall, an 
equivalent number of details and used an equivalent mean number of words.   
 These novel results fill the gap in the current literature concerning the ability to simulate future 
events in patients with episodic memory impairments. On the one hand, it is well known that healthy 
older adults produce fewer episodic and more semantic details, as compared to younger adults, for both 
past (Addis et al., 2008, Levine et al., 2002 and Piolino et al., 2002) and future (Addis et al., 2008) events. 
On the other hand, it has been recently shown that AD patients produce fewer internal and external 
details as compared to healthy older adults for both past (Addis et al., 2009b, Ivanoiu et al., 2006 and 
Leyhe et al., 2009) and future (Addis, Sacchetti, et al., 2009) events. Furthermore, there is evidence of 
reduced episodic specificity in autobiographical memory in aMCI patients (Murphy et al., 2008). Recently, 
Addis, Sacchetti, et al. (2009) acknowledged that “while amnesic MCI patients exhibit significant declines 
in memory for internal-episodic details, as do AD patients, it appears they can still rely on strategies also 
used by older adults when describing past and future events” (p. 2668). The results of the present study 
extend the impaired episodic-spared semantic trend to simulating future events in aMCI, placing the 
performance of aMCI patients at an intermediate position between that of healthy elderly and AD 
patients. We suggest, in line with Addis, Sacchetti, et al. (2009), that the three stages – from healthy aging, 
through aMCI, to AD – of the impairments affecting past and future thinking may reasonably reflect the 
progress of the neuropathological changes associated with these conditions, i.e., from initial functional 
and structural changes that affect the medial temporal area in normal aging (Driscoll et al., 2003), 
encompassing the hippocampus and surrounding cortical regions, to a more severe, though selective, 
impairment of the hippocampus and other medial temporal lobe regions in aMCI (e.g., Jack et al., 2000 
and Killiany et al., 2002), to a more extensive atrophy beyond the medial temporal regions to larger 
portions of the neocortex (supporting semantic memory) in AD (Leyhe et al., 2009).  
 Therefore, the results of the present study, in conjunction with the findings of Addis et al. (2008), 
Addis, Sacchetti, et al. (2009) and of Murphy et al. (2008), provide evidence for the close linkage between 
remembering the past and imagining future.      
 There are, however, some relevant issues that need to be considered. One issue pertains to the 
status of the semantic component of autobiographical memory in aMCI. In line with results of Murphy et 
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al. (2008), we found a pattern of reduced episodic but elevated semantic autobiographical memory in 
aMCI, as compared to controls. However, it is important to note that, in a recent study, Leyhe et al. 
(2009) detected an impairment in both the semantic and the episodic components of autobiographical 
memory in aMCI patients. These different results may be due to differences in the experimental task used 
to assess autobiographical memory. Like Murphy et al. (2008), we used the Autobiographical Interview by 
Levine et al. (2002), which extracts indices of semantic and episodic autobiographical information from 
within a single narrative. In contrast, Leyhe et al. (2009) used the Autobiographical Memory Interview by 
Kopelman, Wilson, and Baddeley (1990), which probes episodic and semantic memory separately, 
through the recall of specific past events and names, and addresses, respectively, across the lifespan. It has 
been argued that these separate measures artificially divide these two forms of autobiographical memory, 
which co-occur and interact in naturalistic autobiographical discourse, assessing them with tasks 
unmatched in sensitivity, content, and psychometric characteristics (Murphy et al., 2008).  
 A further relevant issue pertains to our findings concerning the novelty of imagined future 
events. In the present study, almost all aMCI participants rated their imagined future events as already 
occurred, more or less frequently, in the past. In contrast, only a small percentage of events produced by 
controls were rated as already occurred in the past. It is relevant to note that, in a recent study, Gamboz 
et al. (2010) acknowledged that self-projection into the future may appear much more difficult than 
remembering the past and may consequently lead the participant to rely, more or less deliberately, on 
some alternative strategies. In line with their hypothesis, the authors showed that, occasionally, people do 
indeed reproduce events that have already occurred in the past or that are very similar to past events, 
rather than envisioning truly novel events. Given that, in the present study, aMCI patients tended, more 
than controls, to produce future events that were rather similar to past events, it could be posited that 
they had difficulty constructing scenarios that had never happened and therefore fell back (partially) on 
old episodic memories. If this were the case, this finding would cast some doubt on the accrued wisdom 
that future thinking and remembering involve primarily similar processes. One could argue, at least on the 
basis of this observation, that future thinking involves additional cognitive processes which are impaired 
in aMCI. This hypothesis is indirectly supported by results of neuroimaging studies. Recently, Addis, Pan, 
et al. (2009) identified, in healthy young adults, two subsystems within the network involved in 
remembering and imagining events, the imagining subsystem and the remembering subsystem, consisting, 
respectively, of neural regions that responded more strongly to imagining than remembering, and of 
regions showing the reverse pattern. The authors suggested that the imagining subsystem may reflect the 
increased cognitive demands related to recombining episodic details into an imaginary scenario, as 
opposed to the recasting of an entire past event. Future research should therefore focus on identifying the 
neural correlates of remembering and imagining in aMCI patients, as well as in other pathological 
conditions. This approach, associated with the analyses of subjective and objective detail ratings (i.e., 
according to Levine et al.’s procedure) may significantly improve our understanding of patients’ ability to 
simulate future events.         
 Finally, another result that is worthy of notice in the present study is the number of internal and 
external details produced by controls and aMCI patients. Healthy older adults and aMCI patients who 
participated in earlier studies produced a mean number of internal and external details larger than controls 
and aMCI patients in the present study.2 The differences in the number of details seem not to be related 
to differences in the participants’ selection criteria, as the groups of aMCI patients and controls were 
almost equivalent across the studies with respect to mean age and education. Therefore, it appears more 
reasonable that these divergent findings are associated with factors inherent to the specific task used in 
the different studies. For instance, in Levine et al. (2002) and in Murphy et al. (2008) participants were 
asked to choose, in the context of the Autobiographical Interview (Levine et al., 2002), a personal past 
memory event that happened at a specific time and place for specific life periods. These events were 
presumably the most accessible and, therefore, the most likely to yield detailed recollections. On the other 
hand, in the studies by Addis et al. (2008), Addis, Pan, et al. (2009) and Addis, Sacchetti, et al. (2009) 
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participants were cued to recollect past events (and to simulate future events) by means of single words. 
This procedure is unquestionably more demanding than freely recollecting past experiences. However, 
these authors also used general probes to clarify instructions and encouraged further description of 
details. In the study by Murphy et al. (2008) general probes were also given to encourage recall of detailed 
information, particularly if the participant had trouble coming up with a specific detailed memory or 
provided a very brief recollection.        
 In the present study, a relevant aspect of the procedure was that participants were cued to 
recollect and simulate past and future events by means of single words and no general probe was 
provided. Apparently, the procedure of the present study provides the participants with the lowest 
support for recollection and simulation of events, and may thus be responsible for the overall lower 
number of details produced by controls and aMCI.     
 Overall, the analysis of extant results in the literature reveals that research in this area is still in its 
infancy and needs to be further informed in the future by advances in understanding of both the 
quantitative and qualitative differences in the ability of normal and pathological populations to engage in 
episodic future thinking. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Mean ratings (and standard deviations) as a function of event type (past, future) and 
group (aMCI, control).  
  Past events 
Future 
events     
  C aMCI C aMCI 
Sensorial details 4.2 (1.1) 3.6 (1.3) 4.0 (1.3) 3.6 (1.0) 
Clarity of location 5.1 (1.0) 5.7 (0.6) 5.1 (0.9) 4.8 (0.9) 
Feeling of experiencing 6.2 (0.9) 5.1 (1.6) 6.0 (0.9) 4.4 (1.7) 
Frequency of occurrence (novelty)     1.6 (0.9) 4.2 (1.5) 
 
Note: Novelty decreases proportionately as frequency of occurrence increases, i.e., the lower the rating, 
the higher the novelty.  
 
 
 
Table 2. Frequency distribution of ratings concerning the novelty of future scenarios in aMCI 
patients and controls. 
 
Ratings aMCI C 
1 28.6 66.1 
2 1.8 26.8 
3 3.6 0 
4 12.5 0 
5 17.9 5.4 
6 12.5 0 
7 23.2 1.8 
 
Note: The numbers indicate the percentage of events that received ratings from 1 to 7 (out of 56 near 
events and 56 distant events). 
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Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1   Mean number of internal and external details per event generated for past and future events by 
aMCI patients and controls. Error bars are standard errors of the mean. 
 
